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INTRODUCTION
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants greatly 
appreciates this opportunity to offer comments and 
recommendations prepared by our Federal Tax Division on H.R. 
1864, a bill to simplify the nondiscrimination rules applicable 
to employee benefit plans under section 89 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.
The AICPA is the national, professional organization of CPAs, 
with over 280,000 members. Many of our members are tax 
practitioners who work with millions of American taxpayers, both 
individuals and businesses. We are deeply concerned with the 
effect of section 89 upon businesses of all sizes, in all sectors 
of the economy.
The AICPA applauds the Chairman on a bill that significantly 
limits compliance costs by focusing on plan availability rather 
than plan coverage. Given that the cost of compliance was the 
AICPA's most significant concern with existing IRC section 89, we 
generally support the proposed legislation with only a few 
changes, such as the treatment of salary reduction or cafeteria 
plans and the appropriate indexing of employee contributions for 
a qualified core health plan. While we will make a number of 
suggestions for changing the proposed legislation, we want to 
make it clear that we generally support the approach presented.
We have received hundreds of calls from CPAs requesting 
assistance in implementing section 89 for their clients. Many of 
our members report that their clients, both small and large, are 
finding the statute too complicated to interpret and far too 
expensive to administer. We believe that the end result of these 
tests will be relatively minor changes to an individual's 
Form W-2. This is an instance where the cost of compliance far 
outweighs any benefit derived from the resulting information, 
even for the Treasury Department.
In November, we mailed to our 22,000 Tax Division members a copy 
of our 15-page practice guide which focused on the small business 
entity which has only one employee plan; thus, it did not 
encompass most of the complexities of section 89 which are 
proving to be literally unworkable. Even in the relatively 
simple situation described in our practice guide, there were many 
questions which remained unanswered.
2
Many taxpayers are unable or unwilling to understand the rules. 
They are seriously considering whether to eliminate some or all 
of their employee health coverage. Others plan to eliminate the 
tax preferred health coverage for highly compensated employees 
(HCE). These are both extreme reactions to tax legislation which 
requires far too much data collection and manipulation. While 
the reactions may not be appropriate, they are occurring 
nonetheless.
The complexity of these rules has resulted in widespread 
misunderstanding of the provisions and will lead to growing 
enforcement problems for the Internal Revenue Service. Section 
89 is a notable example of the inevitable linkage of complexity 
and noncompliance.
Large employers incur tremendous costs in complying with section 
89. One employer, a Fortune 100 company with 45,000 employees in 
2,000 locations, must test approximately 300 "plans” under 
section 89. As a result of the test, some 1,500 highly 
compensated employees will recognize additional income of 
approximately $650,000. To calculate the additional income to be 
recognized, the employer has incurred additional consulting fees 
of $260,000 through December 31, 1988. This does not include the 
additional costs incurred within the corporation in compiling the 
data. Annual expected cost to this employer for testing and 
documentation is $250,000. No new or increased health benefits 
were provided to employees since the cost of the increased 
benefits far exceeds the tax burden to the highly compensated 
with respect to this additional section 89 gross income.
Comments on general approach of H.R. 1864
Although we are suggesting a number of changes for the proposed 
legislation, we want to make it clear that we generally support 
the approach presented. The testing of discrimination with an 
availability test is far superior to using a coverage test. We 
agree with H.R. 1864’s change in definition of part-time 
employees from those working at least 17 1/2 hours to those 
working 25 hours; however, the proportional allowable increase in 
employee contributions should be based on a 40-hour week not a 
35-hour week. We generally agree with H.R. 1864's reversion 
(with minor modification) to pre-1986 Tax Reform Act law for the 
group term life insurance discrimination tests. We also agree 
with the delay in testing former employees but would suggest a 
permanent exclusion of these employees from the rules. We agree 
with the elimination of the rule that requires every employer to 
have at least one highly compensated employee. This is 
especially helpful for small tax exempt and governmental 
employers.
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The treatment of salary reduction amounts under the proposed 
legislation discourages the adoption of cafeteria plans
Amounts funded through salary reduction arrangements are treated 
as employee contributions for purposes of the eligibility test. 
Thus, salary reduction amounts may not exceed the $10/$25 
limitation on employee contributions for the plan to be a 
qualified core health plan. This treatment of salary reduction 
amounts recognizes that salary reduction represents a cost to the 
employee. Accordingly, the required employee contribution funded 
through salary reduction is viewed in the same manner as a 
required employee contribution not funded through salary 
reduction in determining whether a plan is affordable to 
nonhighly compensated employees.
For purposes of the benefits test, salary reduction is treated as 
an employee contribution rather than as an employer provided 
benefit included in the base amount for applying the 133 percent 
factor. Consequently, salary reduction made available to or 
utilized by nonhighly compensated employees (NHCE) does not 
increase the level of coverage that can be received by the highly 
compensated employees under the benefits test.
For purposes of determining the taxable benefit of a highly 
compensated employee, salary reduction amounts are considered 
employer provided benefits. Thus, to the extent that these 
amounts, when added to other employer-paid coverage, exceed the 
133 percent limitation imposed by the benefits test, the salary 
reduction is included in the taxable income of the highly 
compensated employee thereby nullifying his salary reduction.
For example, assume an employer offers a salary reduction plan 
with three benefits available through salary reduction: core 
plan II, valued at $2,000, medical reimbursement and a dental 
plan. All employees are provided, on a nonsalary reduction 









Annual Plan Value $1,000 $2,000 $500 $400
Single Employee Annual
Salary Reduction Cost _____0 900 500 400
Employer Provided 
Benefit $1,000 $1.100 $ 0 $ 0
Percent of NHCE’s Eligible 90 90 90 90
HCE Taxable Benefit 0 670 500 400
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If a highly compensated employee reduces his salary for $900 in 
order to participate in core plan II, he will realize a taxable 
benefit of $670 ($2,000 - (1.33 X $1,000)). If a highly 
compensated employee reduces his salary for core plan II, the 
medical reimbursement and the dental plan, his taxable benefit 
would be $1,570 ($2,900 - (1.33 X $1,000)). A highly compensated 
employee electing only medical reimbursement would have a taxable 
benefit of $170 ($1,000 + 500 - $ 1,330). It should be noted 
that in this example, highly compensated employees get no benefit 
from the salary reduction amount beyond the additional 33 percent 
of the core health coverage provided. This is the result even 
though all health plans are equally available and the employer 
has made an affordable core health plan (core plan I) available 
to more than 90 percent of nonhighly compensated employees.
We believe that this treatment of salary reduction will 
discourage the use of cafeteria plans in providing health 
benefits by eliminating the tax favored status of such 
contributions with respect to highly compensated employees. The 
AICPA believes that cafeteria plans which offer employees a 
choice in designing their benefit package are desirable and that 
the tax law should not discourage the provision of such programs. 
Any discrimination tests in this legislation should not favor 
nonsalary reduction health plan contributions any more or less 
than salary reduction health plan contributions.
Suggestions for changing the testing with respect to salary 
reduction amounts
Within the basic framework of H.R. 1864, there are a number of 
alternatives for testing salary reduction amounts. The 
legislation could allow for inclusion of salary reduction amounts 
in the employer provided benefits for purposes of calculating the 
133 percent limitation if employees can only receive cash if they 
have core medical coverage elsewhere, such as through another 
employer or the employer of the employee’s spouse or parents.
The treatment of salary reduction amounts should be consistent in 
calculating the $10/$25 limitation and the 133 percent limit.
Alternatively, the legislation could allow the average salary 
reduction for all nonhighly compensated employees to be 
considered an employer provided benefit for purposes of 
calculating the 133 percent limitation.
More simply, the legislation could increase the 133 percent 
factor to perhaps 200 percent. With this much allowable 
disparity, cafeteria plans would not find the tests as onerous.
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Another alternative would be to revert to the salary reduction 
rules of TAMRA (The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 
1988) as a means of monitoring the abuses with cafeteria plans.
We believe the best alternative is to exclude health benefits 
provided under cafeteria plans from these discrimination tests. 
If additional discrimination tests are needed in IRC section 125, 
a benefits test for all nontaxable benefits elected under the 
plan might be appropriate.
We believe, as is reflected in H.R. 1864, that salary reduction 
amounts are inherently different from traditional employer 
provided health benefits and thus should be subject to different 
discrimination tests. We also believe that the tests should 
include all benefits available within the cafeteria plan so that 
employees are not penalized by the choice of a specific benefit.
The 90 percent eligibility test should be modified
We believe that the 90 percent eligibility test, which represents 
a good approach, also results in inequities for employers who are 
slightly below the 90 percent cutoff. We suggest that this could 
be alleviated in any of several ways:
o lower the percentage;
o include a graduated penalty schedule;
o eliminate leased employees from this calculation; or
o provide a grace period for employers who substantially meet 
the eligibility rules.
A lower required eligibility percentage would increase the number 
of employers with qualified core health plans. It is unclear why 
health plans are subject to more restrictive rules than the 70 
percent rule of pension plans.
A phase-in of the penalty for failing the eligibility test, such 
that a smaller taxable benefit accrues to employees of an 
employer who covers more than 70 percent of nonhighly compensated 
employees than one who covers less than 70 percent of nonhighly 
compensated employees, would be more equitable. While this would 
involve additional complexity in the legislation, we believe such 
complexity may be warranted so that highly compensated employees 
are not unduly burdened where a plan does not satisfy the 90 
percent test by a small margin.
Elimination of leased employees from the testing would also help 
employers satisfy the 90 percent eligibility test. While we are 
aware that such employees can be disregarded where the lessor 
makes qualified core health coverage available, we are doubtful 
that a lessor’s coverage can easily be considered by the lessee 
in its testing.
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A grace period could be provided for employers who fall below the 
required 90 percent eligibility standard by a certain margin. It 
is possible for an employer who has met the 90 percent test in 
prior years to fall slightly below that level due to such things 
as mergers or unexpected rapid growth in employment. These 
employers could avoid all penalties for the first year such 
eligibility test was not met, giving them time to comply. For 
1989, the grace period could apply to all employers.
Alternatives to $10/$25 limits would be a better measure of 
affordability
The $10 and $25 limits are not properly adjusted for cost of 
living increases. In the very near future more and more 
employers will fail to satisfy the $10/$25 affordability standard 
because medical costs are increasing at a much greater rate than 
wages. Many small employers with higher health insurance costs 
because of their relatively small groups already find these rates 
inadequate. As the cost of health premiums increase, employers 
will be forced to pay a higher percentage of the cost, offer a 
plan which no longer qualifies as a qualified core health plan or 
lower the value of the qualified core health plan offered.
While we understand that an affordability test should be related 
more to wages than to medical costs, we believe that the law must 
recognize that employers also have limited resources to put into 
health plans. If employees cannot share future increases in 
medical premiums, it is quite likely that coverage will be 
reduced or plans discontinued. A limit on increasing the 
employee cost for a qualified health plan will decrease the 
incentive for providing health coverage in the near future.
We believe that using a percentage of total premium costs to 
determine an affordable plan, perhaps not to exceed a certain 
percentage of an individual's wages, would add needed flexibility 
to the affordable plan defined in the proposed statute and put 
the small employer more at parity with the large employer. Tying 
the allowable employee cost to a percentage of the employer's 
total premium cost would ensure that it would keep pace with 
medical inflation and with that particular employer's cost for 
group coverage. Adding the percentage of compensation cap would 
ensure that non-highly compensated employees do not pay too great 
a portion of their wages for health benefits.
For example, assume the maximum employee contribution is the 
lesser of 40 percent of premium or 5 percent of wages. Assume 
wages increase 2 percent per year and medical premiums increase 
25 percent per year.
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As this indicates, the very low paid employee is protected by the 
5 percent wage cap, while the $30,000 employee would continue to 
contribute the 40 percent of premium. The additional premium for 
the $10,000 employee would be absorbed by the employer. However, 
with other employees sharing the increased costs, this 
arrangement will encourage employers to maintain reasonable 
health plans.
Defining the affordable plan as a percentage of the health 
premium will not penalize the employer who wants to offer a very 
generous plan with a required employee contribution of more than 
the $10 or $25. One of the inappropriate results of the proposed 
legislation is that the highly compensated employees have a 
taxable benefit for all health coverage which is not available 
through an "affordable” plan. This results even if the employer 
makes available an affordable plan and a more expensive plan on 
an equal basis.
For example, assume an employer offers to all employees on a 
nonsalary reduction basis, two core health plans, (core plans I 
and II), a dental plan and a vision plan with the following 









Annual Plan Value $ 950 $2,000 $350 $400
Single Employee After 
Tax Annual Cost 450 900 150 300
Employer Provided 
Benefit $ 500 $1,100 $200 $100
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An employee can participate in one of the core plans and the 
dental and vision plans. If a highly compensated employee 
participates in core plan I, the dental plan and the vision plan, 
a total employer provided benefit of $800 ($500 + $200 + 100) 
will be received, of which $135 ($800 - (1.33 X 500)) would be 
taxable. This is because the dental and vision plans cannot be 
aggregated with either core plan I or II and still have such 
plans treated as qualified core health plans. If participating 
in core plan I, the highly compensated employee can receive a 
tax-preferred benefit of $665 (1.33 x 500). If participating in 
core plan II only, which is not a qualified core health plan, the 
taxable benefit for a highly compensated employee is $435 
($1,100 - $665). Participation in either the dental or vision 
plan by a highly compensated employee who participates in core 
plan II, cannot be on a tax-favored basis, even though the 
benefits are available to all employees on a similar basis. 
Accordingly, a highly compensated employee participating in core 
plan II, the dental plan and the vision plan would have a total 
employer provided benefit of $1,400 ($1,100 + $200 + $100) of 
which $735 ($1,400 - $665) would be taxable.
The excludable employees should not be affected by plan coverage
In determining whether 90 percent of employees are eligible for 
coverage, it is important that the employer accurately count his 
total employee population. Certain categories of employees can 
be excludable, but only if no employee in that category is 
included in the health plan. This complicates the testing 
process and penalizes employers for allowing certain employees to 
participate. For example, assume an employer offered health 
benefits to employees working 10 hours or more in prior years. 
When this employer changed health benefit eligibility to 
employees working more than 25 hours per week, the continuing 
employees working fewer than 25 hours and more than 10 hours were 
allowed to remain in the plan. These employers are now 
penalized by being required, in calculating the 90 percent test, 
to include in the employee group all employees working more than 
10 hours per week.
Another situation with inappropriate results occurs when the 
employer provides immediate coverage for all employees or for 
some part-time employees, perhaps because they are classified as 
permanent. For example, an employer may offer health coverage to 
all employees at the beginning of employment. The employee is 
classified as part-time or full-time based on actual hours worked 
during the first three months of employment. If the employee is 
a part-time employee, coverage is eliminated. This employer is 
penalized because all employees are included in the employee 
population. The exclusion for part-time employees is not 
available since part-time employees are provided benefits for 
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three months. Here, an employer who offers more health benefit 
coverage than required is being penalized by expansion of the 
group of employees tested.
Under existing rules, IRC section 89(h)(5) allows the employer 
to separately test employees receiving benefits who otherwise 
were excludable employees. This has been eliminated in the 
proposed legislation. If the excludable employees can be tested 
separately, the plans would be nondiscriminatory. This separate 
testing rule mitigates the harsh effect of requiring such 
employees to be included in the employee group.
The AICPA favors elimination of the rules which require 
adjustment of the excludable group based on plan coverage. At a 
minimum, inclusion of the separate testing rule in the 
legislation is needed.
Good faith compliance with separate line of business rules
The bill allows these rules to be applied on a separate line of 
business or operating unit basis. We recommend that the 
legislation make it clear that a good faith attempt to comply 
with such rules is sufficient until after the publication of 
final regulations. Final regulations should only be effective 
after issuance.
Existing law modifications should conform
Under the bill, employers who use existing section 89 for 1989 
testing may not use any of the bill’s improvements, such as the 
25-hour rule for determining part-time employees. This is an 
especially harsh result for those employers. If an employer uses 
the new rules, he has the advantage of being able to use the more 
liberal part-time employee rules. However, the employer who uses 
the old rules is at a disadvantage. These employers should be 
given the same advantage as the employer who uses the new rules.
Valuation rules need clarification
The bill provides that the value of coverage provided by any 
health plan should be determined under procedures prescribed by 
the Secretary. TAMRA provides special transitional rules for 
testing years beginning before the later of January 1, 1991 or 
the date one year after the Secretary of the Treasury first 
issues such valuation rules as are necessary to apply the 
provisions of section 89. The bill should include the special 
transitional relief available in TAMRA.
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Discriminatory terms test adversely affects accidental death and 
dismemberment
Accidental death and dismemberment insurance plans and business 
travel accident insurance plans will most likely fail the 
discriminatory terms test. The benefits payable under such plans 
are generally based on an employee’s compensation. These plans 
should be excluded from testing under section 89. The value of 
such plans is de minimis in relation to the effort to properly 
include such amounts on an employee’s W-2. Alternatively, the 
legislation could provide that such plans are not in violation of 
the discriminatory terms test if benefits vary as a uniform 
percentage of compensation.
Dependent care assistance discrimination test is too harsh
Existing law allows dependent care assistance to pass a 55 
percent benefits test or be included in the section 89 test with 
health benefits. The proposed legislation would eliminate the 
ability to test dependent care assistance with health benefits. 
The separate line of business rules also do not apply to these 
tests. We recommend that the dependent care assistance rules be 
reviewed. Inclusion of a separate benefits test for all 
nontaxable benefits in a cafeteria plan may satisfy this concern 
because most dependent care assistance, other than employer owned 
facilities, is offered on a salary reduction basis.
The exclusive benefit rule should allow nonemployees in an 
employer's plan
We believe that section 89(k)(l)(D) should be amended to allow a 
de minimis number of individuals with no service nexus with the 
employer to participate in a plan without violating the exclusive 
benefit rule.
According to the legislative history of section 89, Congress 
believed that the cost of allowing an employer deduction for 
health benefits was justified if the important social policy 
objective of increasing health insurance coverage was met. Thus, 
section 89(k) was designed to broaden, not restrict, coverage. 
According to the General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
"Congress did not intend that a plan fail to satisfy the 
exclusive benefit rule merely because benefits are provided under 
the plan to non-employees on a basis that is not tax favored." 
The intent in implementing the exclusive benefit provision of 
section 89(k)(l)(D) was not to restrict coverage of non­
employee plan participants to only those who perform significant 
services. However, this is required in the proposed 
regulations.
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The floor statement to this proposed legislation addressed the 
exclusive benefit requirement of current law by providing that, 
"this exclusive benefit requirement is satisfied if the number of 
individuals with no service nexus to the employer who 
participate in the plan is de minimis." We believe H.R. 1864 
should make the rule clear for all future years. We understand 
that proposed regulations generally do not become effective 
until 1990.
Allowing individuals with no service nexus into an employer's 
plan on a non tax-favored basis does not violate the social 
policy behind section 89. Including such individuals will 
actually increase health insurance coverage. The only problems 
caused by including such individuals could be with adverse 
selection against insurance companies. Thus, the ability for an 
employer to include such individuals should be regulated by the 
insurance industry and their contracts with an employer, not 
through the tax law.
Qualification rules in general
The purpose of the qualification rules is to ensure that 
employees receiving a tax preference for certain benefits are 
actually receiving those benefits and not cash. We believe that 
these rules should conform with existing ERISA rules to ease 
administration for the employer.
The effective date of existing law should be delayed
While we are aware that the proposed regulations offer a number 
of transitional rules and delayed effective dates, we believe 
that these should be incorporated in H.R. 1864. Depending on the 
timing of legislative action on IRC section 89, a further delay 
may be necessary. Such delay should be statutory.
CONCLUSION
In view of the burdens placed on practitioners and businesses by 
section 89, legislative relief is needed. Given that the cost of 
compliance was the AICPA's most significant concern, we 
congratulate the Chairman on a proposal which saves compliance 
dollars by focusing on plan availability rather than coverage. 
The AICPA will be pleased to continue working with the committee 
to accomplish its objectives.
SUMMARY
The AICPA applauds the Chairman and the entire committee on 
undertaking the important task of providing meaningful relief 
from the myriad of complex rules contained in section 89. We 
strongly recommend that the new legislation adopt a design-based 
approach, focusing on plan availability rather than plan coverage.
As part of the design-based approach, the excludable part-time work 
force should be those employees working less than 25 hours per week. 
Leased employees should be excluded from the test until the 
definition of a leased employee becomes more clear. While several 
categories of workers should be excluded, such exclusion should not 
be impaired if the employer allows some of those workers into a 
health plan.
In a design-based approach, some type of affordability test is 
necessary. We recommend that the employee's maximum contribution 
be defined as a percentage of the employer's health care cost, with 
a ceiling based on an employee's wages. This will reflect an 
employer's actual cost, the difference in regional health care 
costs, and the difference in costs for different group sizes.
We believe the definition of highly compensated employees should be 
simplified. Many employers do not need to use the detailed rules 
of IRC section 414(g) and would welcome a simplified system.
We do not believe it is necessarily good tax policy to design one 
set of qualification and testing rules for all types of plans, 
employers, and groups of employees. Cafeteria plans and group term 
life insurance plans should be governed by sections 125 and 79 
respectively, and not included in the design-based test for health 
coverage.
The penalty for failing the qualification rules should be borne by 
the employer, rather than employees, perhaps through an excise tax. 
This tax should be calculated on the cost of the coverage, rather 
than amounts paid or incurred.
